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LEGISLATION
Public Employee Labor Relations:
Proposals for Change in Present State Legislation
I. INTODUCMON
One of the most striking developments in labor relations during the
past fifteen years has been the rapid increase of both employment
and union organization in the public sector. In 1950, there were
approximately 6 million public employees; today there are over 10
million, over three quarters of whom work on the state and local level.1
It is estimated that 1.5 million of these government employees are
members of various union organizations, a sixty per cent increase
over the past ten years.
2
As a result of this growth, public employees have increasingly sought
and gained organizational and bargaining rights parallel to those
enjoyed by their counterparts in the private sector. These advances
are significant in light of the fact that government employees have
been explicitly excluded from coverage under comprehensive federal
and state legislation which guarantees private employees the rights
of self-organization, collective bargaining, and participation in other
concerted activities.3 President Kennedy's 1962 Executive Order4 has
established a clear-cut, constructive policy for the federal government's
dealings with its employees and their problems. At the state level,
however, there remains the need for legislation designed to achieve
similar ends.
1. In 1950, 6,026,000 persons were employed by governments on the federal, state,
and local levels. In 1965, the figure had risen to 10,051,000. State and local government
employees accounted for 4,098,000 of the 1950 figure, as compared with 7,673,000
in the 1965 statistics. BunrA t OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMm ERCE, 1965
STATSTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UN= STATES 223 (Table No. 306) (1950 figures);
1966 id. 224 (Table No. 315) (1965 Figures).
2. Donovan, Labor Relations in the Public Service: A Survey, 14 IND. & LAD. RtL.
REP. CARD (March 1966). Some of the fastest growing unions today are those organ-
izing in the public sector. See, e.g., Wurf, Unions Enter City Hall, 48 Pun. MANAcE-
,ENT 245 (1966), which states that the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) has a growth rate five times that of the American
labor movement as a whole.
3. See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, 61 Stat. 143
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 150A, § 2(2) (1965).
But see MIN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.51-58 (Supp. 1965).
4. Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962). For an exhaustive study of
labor relations in the federal service under this Executive Order, see VOSLOO, COLLEC-
TIVE BARcANING IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE (1966).
LEGISLATION
Experience in private employment has demonstrated that effective
collective bargaining is essential to meaningful labor relations. How-
ever, the development of collective bargaining in public employment
has been impeded by a generally unfavorable public attitude toward
government employee organizations, often reflected in judicial and
legislative pronouncements.5 The present trend is toward closing the
gap between the public and private sectors, as evidenced by the
recent prevalence of legislation guaranteeing public employees the
right to organize.6 Such a guarantee, however, requires legislative
machinery which will promote and regulate effective collective bar-
gaining in the public service without automatically eliminating all
public employees' right to strike.7 This note will examine and evaluate
existing state legislation governing both public employee strikes and
procedures for promoting effective collective bargaining in public
5. The legal approach to the public employee's right to organize extends from legis-
lative denial to constitutional guarantee. Compare ALA. CODE § 55-317(2) (1953),
with N.J. CoNsT. art. I, § 19. Alabama's Solomon Act provides that no public employee
has the right to belong to a labor organization. The constitutionality of this provision
was challenged in the state and federal courts over a period of five years, but the
question was never conclusively decided. See Government and Civic Employees
Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 347 U.S. 901 (1954); id., 353 U.S. 364 (1957);
American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 104
So. 2d 827 (1958) (question avoided on ground of no equitable jurisdiction). See
also ABA SECrION OF LABOR RLATiONS LAW, PROCEEDNGs 145-47 (1958) (Report,
Comm. on Law of Governmental Relations) [hereinafter cited as 1958 ABA]; 1959 ABA
112-13. Even in the absence of statutes some courts have been reluctant to endorse
public employee unionism. Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d
741 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (legislature cannot bargain away its discretion). See. also
Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); Note, 55 CoLuM. L.
REv. 343, 349-50 (1955); Note, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 391, 392-96 (1961).
A discussion of the legal and political theories underlying the opposition to public
employee unionism is outside the scope of this note, but has been extensively treated
elsewhere. See Note, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 343 (1955); Note, 75 HAuv. L. REv. 391
(1961); Note, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 852 (1966); Note, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 549. The
various theories advanced include: (a) The benevolent nature of the government
employer. (b) Unionized employees cannot perform their public duties impartially.
(c) Public employee unions are apt to exert inimical political influence upon the
government. (d) The terms of the government worker's employment are determined
by the legislature. (e) Unions will increase the possibility of strikes against the
government. (f) Legislatures and executive personnel cannot delegate the authority
entrusted to them by the public. (g) IMunicipal charters do not authorize labor
contracts.
The history of judicial and political antipathy to public employee unionism indicates
that the soundest approach to the problem must involve enabling legislation which
specifically declares the public employees' rights and the power of the various state
agencies to enter into binding agreements with their workers.
6. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-08; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch- 149, §§ 178G-N
(Supp. 1965).
7. Despite widespread legislative opposition, the strike has not disappeared"from the
public sector. From 1963 to 1965 there were 112 work stoppages in the public service
involving 50,000 employees and resulting in the loss of 232,000 man-days. BUREAu OF
THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1966 STATrs-ncAL ABsTACr OF T UNrrED
STATES 248 (Table 350).
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employment, exposing inherent weaknesses and deficiencies in the
regulatory scheme. It will then suggest a possible solution designed
to cure the present defects.
II. THE BIGHT To STnum
The right of public employees to strike against their government
employer has been expressly denied both by legislative enactment
and judicial decision. Under federal law," a government employee
who strikes, or even asserts the right to do so, may be guilty of a
felony punishable by a 1000 dollar fine and one year's imprisonment.
Although state antistrike statutes9 provide less stringent sanctions,10
they are similarly uncompromising in their absolute prohibition of
strikes by public employees.
In the absence of statutes, most courts have articulated a vague
public policy argument as a basis for denying the right to strike.1'
Against this bloc of nearly unanimous opinion, many commentators, 2
but only a few courts,'3 have voiced their dissent. At every level, dis-
cussion of the public employee's right to strike evokes emotional and
8. 69 Stat. 624 (1955), 5 U.S.C. § 118p-r (1964).
9. Sixteen states have statutes banning strikes by public employees: DEL. CODE
A x. tit. 19, § 1313 (1965); FLA. STAT. § 839.221 (1963); GA. CoDE ANN. § 89-1301
(Supp. 1962); HAwAx REv. LAws § 5-8 (Supp. 1965); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §
178F (1965); Mrcu. STAT. ANN. § 17.455 (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. § 179.51 (1966);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.530 (1966); NEB. STAT. § 48-821 (1960); N.Y. Civ. Snav. LAw
§ 108 (Condon-Wadlin Act); Orno Ruv. CoDE ANN. § 41117.02 (Baldwin 1965); OmE.
.Ev. STAT. § 243.760 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.2 (1964); TF-x. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5154c (1962); VA. CoDE ANN. § 40-65 (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
111.70 (Supp. 1966).
In addition to these laws which provide broad coverage of almost all state and local
government employees, other states have legislated against strikes by specific classifica-
tions of employees. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1962 (firemen); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 36-11-6 (1966) (policemen and firemen).
10. Generally, a striking employee will face discharge and loss of employment rights.
For a more thorough discussion of these statutes, see notes 34-50 infra, and accompany-
ing text.
11. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.
2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (Dist. CL App. 1949); Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of
Edue., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Board of Educ. v. Bedding, 32 Ill. 2d 567,
207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131
A.2d 59 (1957); Delaware River and Bay Authority v. International Organization of
Masters, Mates & Pilots, 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789 (1965); City of Minot v. Local 74,
General Drivers and Helpers Union, 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 1966).
12. See, e.g., Note, 55 COLum. L. RPv. 343, 363 (1955); Note, 75 HAnv. L. REv.
391, 413 (1961); Note, 2 VAND. L. REv. 441, 450 (1949); Note, 1966 Wis. L. REv.
549, 582.
13. Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954); Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684,
355 P.2d 905 (1960), 59 Mici. L. REv. 1260 (1961), 47 VA. L. rEv. 338 (1961), 18




polarized responses.14 It is in this context that one must view the
treatment of the problem by our courts and legislatures.
A. Grounds for Denying the Right To Strike
The legal theory most frequently advanced for judicially denying
the public employees' right to strike is the sacrosanct sovereignty of
the government employer. In Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of
Educ.,15 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors clearly defined
the concept by portraying public employees as the government's
agents, authorized to exercise some of the sovereignty delegated to the
government by the people. The court held that breach of this agency
relationship through a strike was a deliberate denial of government
authority and a direct contravention of public welfare.' 6 Other courts
have extended the sovereignty concept to the point of labelling a strike
by public employees as "treason."17 This sovereignty theory has been
sharply criticized by even the most steadfast advocates of a continued
denial of public employees' right to strike. 8 It is argued that the term
"rights of sovereignty" is singularly inappropriate in a system of
representative democratic government responsive to the electorate. 9
Furthermore, there are indications that the cloak of sovereignty has
been interposed as a justification for many unilateral and inequitable
14. President Woodrow Wilson denounced the 1919 strike of the Boston policemen
as a "crime against civilization." 75 H-anv. L. REv. 391 (1961). President Franklin D.
Roosevelt called a strike by government employees "unthinkable and intolerable"
because its aim was the "paralysis of government." Letter to Mr. Luther Steward, presi-
dent of the Natl Fed'n of Fed. Employees, on Aug. 16, 1937, as quoted in Vogel,
What About the Rights of the Public Employees?, 1 LAB. L.J. 612 (1950). Advocates
of a contrary point of view have spoken out with no greater thoughtfulness or logic.
A former official of AFSCME has said: "Behind almost every strike [of public em-
ployees] is the refusal of a short-sighted public official to meet and discuss with the
public employee." Zander, A Union View of Collective Bargaining in the Public Service,
22 Pu. ADMit. REv. 5, 6 (1962).
15. 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
16. Id. at 276, 83 A.2d at 485. In enjoining a strike by teachers, the court in City
of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958), held
that the teachers exercised a portion of the sovereign government as agents of the state
government under a duty to fulfill the will of the people by refraining from conduct-
such as striking-that would make the schools less efficient. Accord, Board of Educ. v.
Redding, supra note 11 (striking school janitors breach duty as agents to fulfill will of
people); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317,
324 P. d 1099 (1958), 34 WAsH. L. RFv. 216 (1959) (municipal immunity a basis for
enjoining longshoremen's strike).
17. In City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Arnal. Ass'n of St., & Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees, 90 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio 1949), it was stated that the government
was the servant of all the people and that a strike against the public by city transit
workers was both a rebellion against the government and an attempt to destroy it.
See also City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council, supra note 11.
18. See REP. OF GovERNOR Roc=FnELLEa'S COMM. ON'Pun. EMPLOYEE REL. 15, 17
(New York 1966) [hereinafter cited as TAYLOR REPORT].
19. Id. at 15.
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labor decisions by government administrators 0
Closely related to the sovereignty theory is the notion that a strike
is unnecessary against the benevolent2' government employer whose
primary motive is not profit,22 but rather the protection and promotion
of the public interest. Various aspects of this theory have been
utilized to provide some justification for denying public employees the
right to strike. One court stated that the acceptance of government
employment entailed a necessary surrender of some civil rights.2 3
Others have justified the specific surrender of the right to strike on
the ground that the presence of this economic weapon would enable
public employees to exert grossly disproportionate pressure on the
government to the inevitable detriment of the public interest.24 The
argument of disproportionate power is usually buttressed by an asser-
tion that this power is not needed by the government worker since he
is more than adequately compensated by his benevolent employer-a
claim that has been vigorously contested by various studies of the
relative economic positions of public and private employees.2 5
Similarly, the fact that governments are non-profit organizations
cannot obscure the tremendous political pressure for economy in
government-demands that cannot be expected to provide any upward
influence upon the wage scales of public employees.
The reason advanced most frequently for denying public employees
the right to strike is the inherent danger to public health and safety.
Clearly a walk-out of either policemen or firemen poses an immediate
threat to the physical well-being of any community; however, the
courts are seldom faced with such clear-cut situations. Instead, they
apply the health and safety rationale to enjoin strikes by longshore-
men,26 school janitors,2 7 garbage collectors,.2  and transit workers.2 9
20. Id. at 17.
21. See City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council, supra note 11
(fair treatment of public employees will be compelled by law).
22. See Board of Educ. v. Redding, supra note 11.
23. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council, Supra note 11. See
also City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, supra note 16, which held
that public employees surrender certain rights and privileges which if exercised would
be inconsistent with the public interest.
24. Note, 75 HArv. L. Ev. 391, 409 (1961).
25. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 2, at 3-4; Rains, Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 8 LAB. L.J. 548 (1957) (job security); Note, 75 HArv. L. REv. 391,
409 n.111 (1961) (wages).
26. Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, supra note 16.
27. Board of Educ. v. Redding, supra note 11. Here the danger to public health
and safety was deemed acute when picket lines prevented the delivery of milk, bread
and other food to the school cafeteria, and prevented repair of the school's leaking
roof.
28. Donevero v. Jersey City Incinerator Authority, 75 NJ. Super. 217, 182 A,2d 596
(1962).
29. City of Detroit v. Division 26, Amal. Ass'n of St., & Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
[ Vet.. 20
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Nevertheless, in some instances protection of public health and safety
is the most reasonable and realistic basis for a general legislative or
judicial policy of prohibiting public employee strikes. 30
In the absence of statutory guidance, courts have permitted a strike
by public employees only by drawing a sharp distinction between
the proprietary and governmental functions of the state. Although
expressly rejected by the vast majority of courts,31 this distinction was
drawn by the Arizona Supreme Court, which held that employees
could properly contract with and strike against a state agency engaged
in the essentially private function of producing and distributing elec-
trical power.32  Most courts, however, if they do not dismiss the
proprietary-governmental distinction by restricting its use to munici-
pal tort liability, rely on the more general conclusion that all govern-
mental activities are directed toward benefiting the public and any
distinction between them is meaningless.
In addition to the specific. theories outlined above, most, courts
have held that a strike by public employees is either illegal generally
(even in the absence of statute) or against public policy.33 When
faced with this sweeping prohibition, it is difficult to examine the
judicial reasoning with any degree of critical scrutiny. However, in
light of the uniformly condemnatory attitude taken by legislators
and other public officials on the issue of public employee strikes,
the courts' near-uanimous hostility is understandable. If progress is
to be made in developing a more realistic approach to the problem, it
is likely to take place not through a complete lifting of the strike ban,
but through a significant narrowing of current legislative prohibitions.
B. Sanctions Against Striking Public Employees
Present statutes specifically referring to public employee strikes
Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952). In this case the court justified
the denial of the right to strike to transit workers by saying that a failure to stand
firmly would inevitably lead to strikes by policemen and. fiemen.
30. For a further discussion of the proper, application ,of the -health and safety test,
see notes 53-58 infra and -accompanying- text
31. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council, supra note
11 (governmental-proprietary distinction held limited to tort liability); City of Cleve-
land v. Division 268, Amal Ass'n of St. & Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, supra
note 17 (court refused to recognize distinction since relevant statute did not);
Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, supra note 16 (distinction
held to apply to torts only).
32. Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project, supra note 13. Thirteen years before
this case, an Ohio court held that employees in a municipally owned electric light
and water plant had the right to strike for a wage increase since the city was
operating in a proprietary capacity which put it on the same footing as any private
corporation. Board of Trustees v. Now, supra note 13.
33. See, e.g., Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild; supra note 11; City of
1967 ]
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expressly prohibit them. Sixteen states forbid strikes by all public
employees,- and at least two others have prohibited strikes by specific
classes of public workers.35 These statutes are generally enforced by
a court injunction against the striking public employees. 36 In addition,
the attorneys general of several states have written that the strike
weapon should be denied to various public employees.37
The broadly prohibitory state statutes vary greatly in terms of
sanctions provided. Some only deny the right to strike and do not
include any disciplinary reprisals. 38 One state39 follows the federal
government's example,40 and provides a fine up to 5,000 dollars and
imprisonment up to one year. Most statutes, however, provide forimmediate termination of the strikers' employment and forfeiture of
any concomitant right.41 Re-employment may be allowed 42 at the
discretion of the employer, but it is normally limited by the following
three conditions: (1) the employee's compensation cannot exceed
that which he was receiving at the time of the strike; (2) pay raises
are not granted until a certain time period has elapsed; and (3) the
employee is on probation for a fixed duration after re-instatement,
during which period he must serve without tenure and at the pleasure
of his employer. Generally, the period without increased compensation
ranges from one43 to three44 years, as does the probation period.
Minot v. Local 74, General Drivers & Helpers Union, supra note 11; City of Cleveland
v. Division 268, Amal. Ass'n of St., & Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, supra note 17.
34. The states are: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia
and Wisconsin. For full citations to these statutes, see note 9 supra.
35. California and Rhode Island have statutes that refer specifically to policemen
and firemen. For citations to these statutes, see note 9, supra.
36. City of Detroit v. Division 26, Amal. Ass'n of St., & Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees, supra note 29 (injunction granted in strike against street railway system);
City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amal. Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Em-
ployees, supra note 17, (city transit workers' strike enjoined). The use of the in-
junction as the key enforcement mechanism has been criticized on the ground that
elected public officials are naturally reluctant to ask for it due to danger of a labor
backlash in areas with significant union political strength. See Note, 1966 Wxs. L. RFv.
549, 551. A provision requiring a state official to initiate court action for injunctive
relief would seem to obviate any such "political" difficulties. TAYLOR REPonT 43.
37. See, e.g., O.'s. ATT'y GEM. N.M. No. 59-90, July 31, 1959; Ors. ATr'" Gmr.
Wash., Nov. 19, 1958.
38. Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oregon and Wisconsin. For citations
to these statutes, see note 9 supra.
39. See Nebraska statute cited note 9 supra.
40. See Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, 61 Stat. 143
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964).
41. Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas
and Virginia. For citation to these statutes see note 9 supra.
42. Only Texas has no provision for re-instatement.
43. See, e.g., the Minnesota, Ohio and Virginia statutes cited note 9 supra.
44. See, e.g., the Georgia and Pennsylvania statutes cited note 9 supra.
[ VOL. 20
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These severe sanctions, however, have been of questionable deter-
rent value45 to the strikes they seek to prevent, and often will not
be applied by a public employer primarily concerned with restoring
to operation a particular service that has been interrupted. Moreover,
where a certain amount of skill and training is required by the em-
ployee, an administrator is understandably reluctant to have his
workers automatically discharged. Consequently, either the law is
not invoked in situations where it is clearly applicable, 46 or if applied,
its sanctions are not enforced.47
Continual failure to apply the law leads to general disrespect for
the particular provision, thus further thwarting its very purpose. If
antistrike laws are to remain vital, they must be revised to meet the
realities of government-employee relations. As more effective
mechanisms 48 are developed to help solve labor disputes in public
service, the strike may become a less useful economic weapon. How-
ever, the threat of strikes will continue to exist, making it incumbent
upon the state legislatures to improve antistrike statutes by re-shaping
them in the spirit of reasoned dialogue between public employer and
employee that is developing in other areas of public labor dispute
settlement.49 For example, the concept of automatic termination of
employment should be reconsidered and steps should be taken for
an orderly process of review50 concerning the causes behind the
employee's actions before he is subjected to the stringent sanctions
now in force.
C. Evaluation
It is by no means settled that the present antistrike laws are
satisfactory in terms of their broad extension to any and all public
employees. At least one legislature has impliedly granted the right
45. See the work stoppage statistics in note 7 supra. One study has even purported
to show that the average annual number of strikes by public employees in New York
actually increased after passage of the antistrike law. Krislov, Work Stoppages of
Government Employees, 1942-59, 1 Q. REv. OF ECON. & Bus. 87 (1961). See also
Note, 55 CoLUrM. L. Rsv. 343, 360 (1955).
46. See Rosenzweig, The Condon-Wadlin Act Re-Examined, ILR Research, Oct.,
1965, p. 3, at 5 (1965).
47. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1966, § 1, p. 30, col 8 (none of 28,000 striking
transit workers dismissed as required by New York statute; pay raise granted instead).
48. See Part III of this note.
49. Ibid.
50. The Michigan statute provides for a hearing within 10 days of the date of
the strike, with the right to appeal any disciplinary action to a circuit court, which
will determine whether the decision was supported by competent, material and sub-
stantial evidence on the whole record. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(6) (Supp. 1965).
1967 ]
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to strike to municipal transit employees,5 1 and many courts52 have
suggested that statutes permitting strikes by certain groups of public
employees may legitimately be enacted. If and when such permissive
statutes can be enacted, the legislatures should look to the aforemen-
tioned public health and safety test as a guideline for permitting strikes
in the public sector.53 A carefully drawn statute selectively denying
the right to strike on the basis of clear and present threat to the
public health and safety would assuage union dissatifaction by its
limited coverage and mollify public fears with firm safeguards for the
protection of public welfare.
In framing an antistrike statute the legislature should continue to
deny the strike to policemen and firemen. Whether a test be defined
in terms of "essentiality,-M or preservation of health and safety, none
will argue that walk-outs of these public servants could realistically be
tolerated. Similarly, it is generally agreed that a work stoppage in
state-owned liquor stores and the like does not present a serious
hazard to public health and safety. Presumably, such categories could
be specifically excluded from coverage.
Beyond these initial uncomplicated judgments, however, the line
of distinction becomes increasingly fine. The health and safety test
is not easily applied to a strike of transit workers or junior-college
teachers. In these situations it becomes necessary to study carefully
the degree of danger threatened and the likelihood of injury to the
public-two crucial factors which should be balanced against the
employees' need of the power to strike in order to impress their just
demands upon their superiors. Hopefully, it will become increasingly
unnecessary to make such a determination as other methods develop15
by which employees can make known their needs and grievances.
51. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
supra note 13. Here the California Supreme Court construed a statute (CAL. Pun. UnM.
CoDE, App. 1, § 3.6) granting transit workers in a municipally owned transit system
the right to bargain collectively "and to engage in other concerted activities" as a
grant of the right to strike. The court emphasized that this statutory language bad
consistently been interpreted to refer to permissible work stoppages in the private
sector and that it therefore should be similarly applied to this public situation.
Significantly, a recently enacted Louisiana statute provides that public transit workers
may "engage in other concerted activities." LA. REv. STAT. § 23:890 (1965).
52. See, e.g., Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project, supra note 13; Manchester v.
Manchester Teachers Guild, supra note 11; Port of Seattle v. International Longshore-
men's Union, supra note 16.
53. As indicated earlier, both the sovereignty theory and the governmental-pro-
prietary dichotomy are largely irrelevant in the context of a discussion of strike rights
of public employees.
54. Some advocates of selective antistrike legislation have asked for a differentiation
on the basis of how essential the services involved are considered to be-both in
terms of health and safety and in terms of widespread public inconvenience. Note, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 343, 362 (1955).
55. See Part III of this note.
[ VOL.. 20
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In the foreseeable future, however, the courts or legislatures will be
called upon to decide exactly which categories of public employees,
are to be granted the right to strike.
Perhaps the solution lies in distributing the decision-making burden
between the legislature, the courts, and an administrative board.
5 6
The legislature might grant this "middle group" of employees57 a
qualified right to strike, subject to the discretionery power of the
administrative board to petition the court for an injunction if, after a
required period of time, a walk-out has proven dangerous to the
public health and safety.58 This limitation on the present, virtually
unanimous denial of the right to strike should help clarify public
service employee-employer relationships and convince the employee
that his superior can no longer rely upon repressive legislation to
justify a refusal to heed employee problems and grievances. No
longer protected by the comfortable assumption that strikes cannot
legally occur, the government employer will be forced to work toward
developing effective solutions for impasses leading to work stoppage.
Such an atmosphere will be conducive to serious negotiation, and the
danger of strikes should be diminished, not increased, by this en-
lightened legislative and judicial approach.
III. PROMOTION AND REGiLATION OF COLLECnVE BARGANImG
It cannot be over-emphasized that any system of effective labor
relations must depend primarily upon collective bargaining as the
dispute-settling mechanism. However, experience in private labor
relations indicates that controversies are apt to arise in attempts to
establish collective bargaining relationships. In addition, the para-
mount public interest in continuous government service demands an
effort to provide a suitable framework which can assist bargaining
parties unable to resolve their own conflicts. The problem areas in
public employment will no doubt be the same as those in private
labor relations, but the fundamental differences in the nature and pur-
pose of the parties involved may often create unique aspects to the
problems. In order to understand how these differences will affect
the solutions devised, brief consideration must be given to relevant
56. The Public Employment Relations Board proposed in Part IV of this note would
be the most logical body to perform this function.
57. The legislature is probably better equipped than the courts to compile a compre-
hensive list classifying the public employees who should be granted the qualified right
to strike subject to judicial curtailment. The problem of an unforeseen group of
employees improperly classified, or not classified at all, can be met by the power of
injunction when an unanticipated threat to health and safety appears.
58. For a comparison of this suggestion to that employed by some public utilities,
see Shestack, The Public Employee and His Government: Conditions and Disabilities
of Public Employment, 8 V.im. L. Ri-v. 816, 833 n.76 (1955).
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distinctions between the parties in public service and their counter-
parts in private industry.
It has been suggested that in substantial measure, these differences
arise from disparity in purpose between the two types of employers.50
Private business is profit motivated; it is in competition with other
private enterprises, and its management is responsible primarily to
its owners. On the other hand, the public enterprise faces little or
no competition and exists solely for the purpose of providing services,
its managers and funds being controlled by the public.
Perhaps the aspect of government most debilitating to effective
labor relations is its inherent division of authority over working
conditions and budgeting processes.61 In the private sector, the em-
ployer often has broad discretion at the bargaining table;61 but even
when the necessary authority and discretion are granted the public
employer, significantly different factors influence his exercise of that
power. The private employer is limited by such economic factors as
general business trends, wages and working conditions established by
competitors, and the expectations of stockholders. The public em-
ployer, on the other hand, is restricted by prevailing tax policies and
competing claims of other public agencies for a share of public funds.62
These differences in the nature and purpose of the government
employer have not been without effect upon the public employee.
Although many government enterprises resemble private commer-
cial activities, 63 the public employee has traditionally been conscious
of the service-oriented nature of his work. His early organizations
59. Smith & McLaughlin, Public Employment: A Neglected Area of Research and
Training in Labor Relations, 16 IND. & LAB. REL. Rnv. 30 (1962).
60. TAYLOR Ronr 14 (1966). The extent of the problem is manifest in the
bargaining procedure adopted by the city of Philadelphia. Under the Home Rule
Charter a labor contract must be implemented by city council appropriation and
civil service regulation. Thus all labor agreements must be approved by these bodies.
Negotiations take place between a team of city executives including the finance
director, labor relations consultant, p5ersonnel director, and managing director. At
the same time a close liaison must be maintained with the executive branch including
the civil service commission and the city council. The financial aspects of the agree-
ment are transmitted to the council for approval by the mayor in his annual budgetary
message. After approval has been granted by the civil service commission and the
council, these bodies reduce the terms to ordinances and regulations, after which the
contract is signed by the parties. See 1959 ABA 95-96. Because of these complicating
factors negotiations can often consume as much as eight months out of every year.
Rock, Practical Labor Relations in the Public Service, 18 PuB. Pans. RFv. 73 (1957).
61. See TAYLORl REPoRT 26.
62. See Smith & McLaughlin, supra note 59, at 33.
63. See Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project, supra note 13 (manufacture and
sale of electric power); State ex rel Moore v. Julian, 359 Mo. 539, 222 S.W.2d 720
(1949) (municipally owned public utility); State v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,




are better characterized as professional associations than as unions. 64
Historically these organizations have not concerned themselves with
attempts at collective bargaining, but have devoted much of their
energy to membership recruitment and legislative representation.6
The most significant characteristic of public employee associations is
the inclusion of supervisory and, occasionally, even executive per-
sonnel in the membership-a situation wholly alien to unionism as
it has developed in private industry.66
In spite of hostile public attitudes and a frequently unfavorable
legal milieu, public employees have found it increasingly necessary,
or desirable, to organize into associations and unions. 67 The generally
hostile environment toward public employee unionism has given rise to
peculiarities which must be considered in providing a workable legal
framework which will both guarantee employee rights, and, by
encouraging harmonious and continuous public service, be acceptable
to the public at large. 68 The challenge confronting the states is that
of serving the long-run public interest by devising realistic means of
promoting collective bargaining. Thus, procedures must be developed
for establishing the appropriate bargaining unit, determining the
suitable range of bargaining subjects, certifying employee representa-
tives, and resolving the issue of exclusive representation. In addition,
effective provisions for resolving collective bargaining deadlocks must
be devised. The remainder of this note will consider these problems
and the range of solutions adopted by the states.
A. Appropriate Unit Determinations
Perhaps the area of private labor relations least applicable to the
government employee's context is the concept of an "appropriate
64. See Krislov, The Independent Public Employee Association: Characteristics and
Functions, 15 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 510 (1962).
65. Id. at 511.
66. This fact has often generated considerable antipathy between these two types
of public employee organizations. Unions generally consider these associations com-
pany unions. Id. at 519; Zander, A Union View of Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service, 22 PuB. ADMN. REv. 5 (1962). The associations in turn are often antagonistic
toward unions; in fact many have constitutional provisions against affiliation with labor
unions. Krislov, supra note 64, at 519.
67. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
68. In addition to the unique make-up of public employee associations, the hostile
environment in which these organizations have developed has resulted, in sensitivity to
the semantical overtones of terms employed in private labor relations. See 1965 ABA
337, in which an 83-hour teacher strike in Hamtramck, Michigan was described by a
union official as the longest single meeting in his union's history. The Taylor Report
has suggested the term collective negotiations as a substitute for collective bargaining,
TAYL R REPORT 11, while the National Education Association prefers the term profes-
sional negotiations. See Donovan, Labor Relations in the Public Service: A Survey, 14
IND. AND LAB. REL. REP. CARD 3 (March 1966).
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representative unit." Several unique aspects of public employment
contribute to the difficulty posed by this problem. The determination
of an appropriate unit may involve characterizing the word "em-
ployee," since statutory and constitutional provisions in some states
exclude specific types of public employees from the operation of
labor relations laws.69 The question is further complicated by the
existence of public employee associations with a broader membership
base than that generally considered desirable in private industry, and
by the division of authority among public employers.70
Basically, three approaches have developed to resolve the appropri-
ate unit problem: (1) provision in the statute; (2) determination by
the parties; and (3) determination by a labor board.
1. Provision in the Statute.-Wisconsin, the first state to allow public
employees to select an exclusive bargaining representative 7 1 provides
in its basic labor statute which unit shall be appropriate. The legisla-
tion requires the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board to conduct
an election upon petition by either the employee organization or the
public employer "to show separately the wishes of the employees
in any craft, division, department or plant as to the determination
of the collective bargaining unit."72 However, the statute includes
the proviso that whenever "the board finds that a proposed unit
includes a craft" it shall exclude the craft unless the employees therein
file a separate petition.73 This procedure has resulted in over-frag-
mentation of some bargaining units which would probably not have
occurred had the board been granted more discretion in selecting
the appropriate unit.7 4 Such a provision is advantageous, however, in
that it promotes accurate determination of employee desires in every
conceivable bargaining unit. The procedure protects employees in
a small unit from being coerced into accepting a bargaining repre-
sentative not of their choosing while allowing employees wishing to
69. Hutchinson v. Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 Ati. 234 (1923) (firemen); Mxcii.
CONST. art IV, § 48 (civil service employees). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 54-909
(1961) (police); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178G (Supp. 1965) (police, elected
officials and executive officers).
70. See notes 60-65 supra and accompanying text.
71. Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (Supp. 1966) was originally adopted in 1959. The second
state was Connecticut in 1965 (CONN. Gr. STAT. §§ 7-467-77 (1966)); Michigan
was third on July 23, 1965 (Mica. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455 (1-16) (Supp. 1965)) and
Massachusetts followed on Nov. 17, 1965 (MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, §§ 178C-N
(Supp. 1965)).
72. Wis. STAT. § 111.05(2) (1961). This is the same provision which is applicable
to private labor relations and is incorporated by reference in Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)
(d) (Supp. 1966) which deals with collective bargaining units for public employees.
73. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(d) (Supp. 1966).
74. See 1966 ABA 176.
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combine with other divisions to register that preference. However,
it should be noted that the resulting fragmentation may burden the
public employer, forcing him to negotiate separately with several
bargaining agents representing employees with common interests.
The end result could be increased administrative costs and disparate
results for employee units which are essentially alike.75
2. Determination by the Parties.-In 1961, California adopted a
program for negotiations between public employees and public
agencies which guarantees the employees' right to organize, and to
"meet and confer" with their employers.76 By the terms of the statute,
the public agencies of the state and municipalities are authorized to
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for the administration of the
act. This approach has the disadvantage of placing the ultimate power
in one party. 7" It might be argued that such a procedure is flexible,
allowing the parties to adapt their labor relations program to local
needs. However, by vesting the employer with such power, the state
devalues its recognition of the employees' right to determine condi-
tions of employment. More equitable means of providing for variances
in local needs must be sought.78
3. Determination by a Labor Board.-Most states which have
adopted comprehensive programs for public employee relations have
placed the matter of appropriate unit determination in the discretion of
a labor board.79 Three states have enacted provisions substantially
similar to the National Labor Relations Act,80 providing that the unit
selected must assure employees the fullest freedom in exercising their
rights."' Provisos state that law enforcement officers may not be repre-
sented by an organization affiliated with units representing other
75. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board referred to the limitation upon its
discretion to determine the bargaining units in two cases in which employees of di-
visions of the same department were allowed to establish separate bargaining units
from the rest of the department. City of Kenosha, W.E.R.B. Dec. No. 7423 (Feb.
1966); City of Appleton, W.E.R.B. Dec. No. 7424 (Feb. 1966), cited in 1966 ABA 178.
76. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-08.
77. Herrick, Unions for Government Employees-Their Implications, 15TH N.Y.U.
CoNF. ON LAB. LAw 129, 136 (1962).
78. For example, the statute might provide that in the event the parties agree as
to the appropriate unit such agreement shall be binding. In the event the parties
are unable to agree an independent labor board shall be vested with the authority to
make the proper unit determination. See also note 90 infra and acc6mpanying text.
79. See, e.g., CONN. GEr. STAT. REv. § 7-471 (1966); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, §
178H(4) (Supp. 1965); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(13) (Supp. 1965); ORE. 1Ev.
STAT. § 662.435 (1965).
80. 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
81. See MAss. A N. LAws ch. 149, § 178H(4) (Supp. 1966); MacH. STAT. ANN. §
17.455(13) (Supp. 1965); and ORE. REv. STAT. § 662.435 (1965).
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employees, and that professional employees may not be included in
a unit with non-professional employees unless the professionals ap-
prove such inclusion by separate vote.
Some states provide detailed criteria to guide the board in its
determination of an appropriate unit. These criteria appear to have
been developed with an awareness of the unique aspects of public
employment. The Connecticut statute82 provides that the labor board
shall select a unit which insures employees the most complete freedom
of association while grouping together employees who share a clear
and identifiable community of interest. Uniformed and investigatory
employees are in a separate unit and no professional employee can
be included in a group with non-professional employees unless they
specifically vote to be so included. In addition the statute outlines
factors to be considered by the board in determining whether to
include supervisors in a unit with subordinate personnel. 3 A grant of
discretion to include supervisory personnel is sound, because often
the reasons which have led to the traditional exclusion of supervisors
are absent in public employment. No doubt, in private industry
foremen and job supervisors perform many management tasks, but
the inherent division of authority in public employment may deprive
governmental supervisors of these powers. The result can be a
greater community of interest between employees and their super-
visors than between the supervisors and their employers. In addition
many public employee associations have traditionally included super-
visory personnel among their membership and these organizations are
the natural parties to assume the role of labor relations representa-
tion. In the Minnesota enactment,8 six considerations are set out for
each appropriate unit determination. The labor board must consider:
(1) the efficient administration of government; (2) the principles
and coverage of position classification and compensation plans; (3)
the history and extent of organization in the particular unit; (4) the
occupational class and whether it includes administrative and super-
visory personnel; (5) geographical location; and (6) the recommenda-
tions of the parties. Perhaps the soundest criteria are to be found in
recent proposals for a public employment labor statute in New York.
The Taylor Committee Report85 suggests three basic considerations:
82. CONN. GEN. STAT. RIEv. § 7-471 (1966).
83. The board shall consider whether the supervisor: (1) performs management
control duties such as scheduling, assigning, overseeing and reviewing of the work of
their subordinate employees; (2) performs duties distinct and dissimilar to that
performed by the other employees in the proposed unit; (3) exercises judgment in
adjusting grievances and enforcing the collective agreement; and (4) establishes or
participates in establishing performance standards. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-473
(1966).
84. Mn-N. STAT. § 179.52 (1966).
85. TAYLOR REPORT 23-29, 32.
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(1) the definition of the unit must correspond with a community of
interest among employees; (2) the conditions of employment which
the proposed unit wishes to negotiate must be conditions over which
the administrator has discretion either to determine or to recommend
to the determining body; and (3) the unit must be compatible with
the effective fulfillment of the duty of service to the public shared by
the employer and the employees.
The range of solutions either adopted or proposed in various states
indicates the complexity of the problem. Several states suggest that
community of interest must be considered in determining the unit,
thus raising perhaps the most perplexing difficulty.Y6 Employees in a
particular unit may be subject to the same work rules and personnel
practices, thus establishing a community of interest. They may also
have a community of interest with other employees subject to the
same political authority concerning wage plans, job classifications and
retirement benefits. Also, a community of interest may exist among
employees in terms of the collective bargaining relationships de-
veloped prior to the enactment of a labor statute.8 7 Often these
various communities of interest will indicate contradictory solutions to
the appropriate unit question. The city of Cincinnati has attempted to
solve this problem by providing for a system of shifting representative
units.88 For example, in discussions of departmental working condi-
tions, each agency is normally considered the appropriate unit; how-
ever, during wage negotiations the unit is determined by city-wide job
classification.
This system may be more suitable for municipal than for state
employees, but it does suggest two important provisions that should
be included in every basic labor statute. First, the problems likely
to arise in individual situations will vary greatly, and can be most
effectively faced by allowing for a case-by-case determination and by
providing the decision-maker with discretion to select the most appro-
priate solution in each case. Second, each local government or political
subdivision may have problems which are unique, and should be
encouraged, through consultation with all interested parties, to develop
local procedures which are consistent with the general policy of the
basic labor statute.89
86. See, e.g., CONr. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-473 (1966); TAYLOR REPORT 23-29, 32.
87. For example, New York is a state which has as yet failed to enact compre-
hensive legislation dealing with public employee relations, yet collective bargaining
has been developing in various areas in the state. The employees in New York City
have had bargaining rights in substantial measure since 1954. See 1958 ABA 153
(Comm. on State Lab. Legis.); 1960 ABA 201.
88. See 1960 ABA 199.
89. See TAYLOR REPORT 31 which suggests such a solution. Wis. STAT. § 111.70
(Supp. 1966), also employs such an approach. The local procedures developed have
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B. Certification, Recognition and Representation
Certification involves the decision of a labor board concerning the
authenticity of an employee organization's claim that it represents a
certain percentage of employees. An organization may be recognized
by an employer without requiring board action; indeed, harmonious
labor relations should be characterized by more recognitions than
certifications. For the most part the problems in this area are quite
similar to those encountered in private employment, and those states
which have adopted comprehensive labor programs for public em-
ployees have closely followed the procedures of the National Labor
Relations Board 0 However, there is one major distinction between
public and private employment with regard to recognition and
certification problems. Most states deny public employees the right
to strike,91 and some require labor organizations specifically to disavow
this right as a pre-condition to certification or recognition.1
2
A major issue inevitably arising in recognitional disputes is the
extent of the employee organization's representation rights. Three
alternative solutions to this problem of representative status have
been developed: (1) proportional representation; (2) representation
of members only; and (3) exclusive representation. Proportional
representation is a unique solution apparently adopted in only one
state, and there only in relation to school teachers.9 3 The statute
provides for a bargaining council membership. Each employee organ-
ization with members in the bargaining unit is granted representation
on the council in the same ratio that its membership bears to the
total number of employees belonging to labor organizations. This
multi-organization system has been opposed on the theory that it
results in raiding and other inter-union rivalries which detract from
the main interests of both employer and employee.9 Each employee
organization may be more concerned with increasing its proportional
been subject to careful supervision by the WERB to insure that they conform to the
provisions of the basic statute. See 1964 ABA 378.
90. Compare 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 149
(1964), with CoN'1N. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-471 (1966); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §
178H (Supp. 1965); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455 (12) (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. §
111.70 (Supp. 1966).
91. See notes 9-14 supra and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221(2) (1965); 1960 ABA 193; TAYLon Ra Onr
30.
93. CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 13080-8&. The legislation could provide a thorough test for
traditional notions regarding the necessity of exclusive representation. However at the
present time it is under strong criticism from the American Federation of Teachers
and evidence to date on its operation is inconclusive. No bilateral written agreements
of any consequence have been achieved. See 1966 ABA 151.
94. Spero, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 22 Pu. A)Nmi. REv. 1, 3
(1962); TAYLoR REoRT 29.
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representation than with responsible representation of the workers.
Representation of members only means simply that each organiza-
tion negotiates conditions of employment solely for its own members.
It is normally considered the alternative to exclusive representation.
Under the concept of exclusive representation, the employee organiza-
tion which gains a majority of all the employees in a bargaining
unit is given both the right to be the exclusive agent of the
employees for negotiations and the duty to represent equally all em-
ployees in the unit without regard to their membership in the
organization. Since unionism among public employees is disfavored
in many states, denial of exclusive representation may reflect the
hope that unions will thereby be weakened.95 Although seldom
explicitly granted by statute, 6 exclusive representation has been fre-
quently achieved in public labor relations.
97
Employee organizations generally seek exclusive representation be-
cause it guarantees a certain degree of security. This security is not
necessarily inconsistent with employer goals. Efficient public service
demands harmonious labor relations; but a labor organization with
uncertain status is more apt to make' dramatic and unreasonable
demands in an attempt to increase its membership, leading to dis-
ruptive labor disputes. However, by guaranteeing the union's security
the employer is justified in placing greater responsibilities upon the
employee organization. Certainly, if a state wishes to effectuate a
no-strike policy, it must be willing to place major responsibility upon
one employee organization for the conduct of all employees in the
unit.98
It should be noted that opposition to exclusive recognition is on
weak ground in public service. Whatever the situation in private
industry, the government is not a profit-making organization and has a
greater obligation to provide fair and equal treatment to its employees.
Multi-representative negotiations have the double disadvantage of
high administrative costs and unequal results for similar employees.
95. Note, 75 Hnv. L. REv. 391, 401 (1961).
96. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-471 (1966); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, §
178H (Supp. 1965); McH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(11) (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT.
§ 179.52 (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (Supp. 1966).
97. In addition to the statutes cited in note 96 supra, exclusive recognition has been
granted on an ad hoc basis in many bargaining agreements. See Roser, Collective
Bargaining in Philadelphia in MANAGEmNT RErvr-oNs WrT ORGANIZED PuBLIm Em-
PLOYEF-S 103 (Warner ed. 1963); Heisel & Santa-Emma, Unions in Cincinnati Govern-
ment, id. at 116; 1959 ABA 88 (N.Y.C.); Zander, A Union View of Collective Bargain-
ing in the Public Service, 22 PUB. ADmnw. RFv. 5, 7 (1962) (states that AFSCME
entered into agreements for exclusive recognition in 214 state, county, and municipal
jurisdictions in 1962).
98. TAyx.on REPORT 29.
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Exclusive representation would tend to overcome both of these dis-
advantages.
C. Appropriate Bargaining Subjects
A determination of appropriate bargaining subjects is particularly
difficult in public employee relations. The problem arises because
many state laws determine for the parties what would otherwise
be subjects of collective bargaining. A thorough discussion of the
issue would entail an analysis of the various state laws and civil
service commission regulations. Although the difficulty should be
recognized, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this note.
D. Unfair Labor Practices
Several state enactments specify unfair labor practices, 9 closely
resembling those set forth in the National Labor Relations Act.10
All of these statutes delineate employers' unfair labor practices,10 and
only Michigan fails to include parallel provisions for employee organ-
izations.1' 2 However, the Michigan statute defines collective bargain-
ing in terms of a mutual obligation which seems to imply a require-
ment that both sides must bargain in good faith. It is desirable for any
public-employee-relations statute to specify unfair labor practices. The
statute should provide clear rules of conduct to promote harmonious
relations between antagonistic forces. Perhaps the most important
provision is the duty to bargain in good faith, and such a requirement
should be made explicitly applicable to both parties rather than left
unarticulated as in the case of the Michigan statute.
E. Bargaining Deadlocks
At the heart of any public employee labor statute are its provisions
for resolving bargaining deadlocks. Regardless of how effectively
collective bargaining operates, impasses are bound to occur. In any
attempt to provide for the peaceful settlement of disputes, three
fundamental problems are faced: First, a basic lack of collective
bargaining experience, both on the part of employers and employees,
will frequently contribute to major disagreements. Second, there
99. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-470 (1966); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178L
(Supp. 1965); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(16) (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. § 111.70(3)
(b) (Supp. 1966).
100. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 148 (1964).
101. Both the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes specify employee organiza-
tion unfair labor practices, and Wisconsin prohibits unfair practices by employees and
their organizations generally. See statutes cited in note 99 supra.
102. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(15) (Supp. 1966); 1966 ABA 144.
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is the necessity of negotiating under the pressure of budget dead-
lines. In private industry the parties can agree to function under
the old agreement until a new one is hammered out, but this
alternative is seldom available in public employment, since the
employer must be able to estimate his expenses for budget purposes.
Third, division of employer authority necessitates seeking the approval
of several officials before the agreement may be complete. 103
Public employees have traditionally relied upon political pressure
after impasse to force employers to accept their demands.104 Although
employee associations have generally made effective use of lobbying
and other political pressures, these methods have proved insufficient
to obtain all of their desired ends. 05 In addition, political pressure is
more effective as a technique for obtaining long range programs than
for the settlement of immediate and specific controversies. The range
of alternatives available for impasse resolution extends from strikes
to compulsory arbitration. For certain groups of public employees
the strike cannot be considered a viable alternative;'016 thus one must
examine other possibilities. At the opposite end of the continuum from
the strike is compulsory arbitration. This solution has been urged by
some public employee unions'07 and adopted in some statutes'0 a How-
ever, where collective bargaining is in the developmental stages there
is a tendency to rely on arbitration in settling disputes rather than
attempting to resolve differences at the bargaining table.'0 A better
policy would be to seek a middle ground such as that presented in two
alternatives developed by several states-i.e., the alternatives of fact-
finding and mediation.
Mediation differs fundamentally from compulsory arbitration in that
arbitration is basically an attempt by a neutral party to thrust a
solution upon the disputants, whereas mediation is an augmentation of
the collective bargaining process under the guidance of an impartial
party. A mediator attends the bargaining sessions and attempts to
103. See note 60 supra and accompanying text; Roser, supra note 97, at 114. Her-
rick, supra note 77, at 136, adds another problem to the list-the tendency of govern-
ment to attempt to anticipate all problems with regulations with the result that relations
can be inundated by technical rules.
104. See Smith & McLaughlin, supra note 59, at 37; Krislov, supra note 64, at 511.
105. Note, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 549, 560-62.
106. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
107. See 1965 ABA 331; Wortman, Collective Bargaining Strategies and Tactics in
the Federal Service, 15 LAB. L.J. 482, 489-90 (1964).
108. NFB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-801-823 (Supp. 1964). This statute empowers a
special Court of Industrial Relations to arbitrate disputes between public employees
and their employer in any public utility, or commercial enterprise which is owned or
operated by the state of Nebraska or any political subdivision thereof. The decisions
of this court are appealable to the supreme court of the state.
109. See Herrick, supra note 77, at 135, where it is pointed out that in one instance
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aid the parties in reaching a voluntary solution. Emotions are apt to
run high across the bargaining table, and the mediator can serve as a
buffer between the parties. Furthermore, a neutral third party can
help ease the disputants away from extreme positions by providing
fresh insights into the conflict. Particularly in the area of public
employment a mediator can bring to the bargaining table skill and
diplomacy that the parties themselves may lack through inexperience.
Several states have made mediation facilities available to disputants
in public employment. 10 The Michigan provisions are of particular
interest. The Michigan Labor Mediation Board has authority to
invoke jurisdiction to mediate at the request of either party, and is
granted subpoena power to compel the other party's attendance.
The most popular dispute-settling technique appears to be fact-
finding "-a process closer to compulsory arbitration than mediation.
Fact-finding is in reality a form of non-binding arbitration, involving
a third party who holds hearings, makes findings of fact and recom-
mendations for resolving the dispute. Its rationale appears to be
either that the parties may be more likely to reach a voluntary agree-
ment on a settled record of facts, or that publication of the facts and
recommendations may crystalize public opinion, forcing the parties to
reach agreement. Fact-finding is not inconsistent with mediation and
may serve as a supplemental procedure in the event that mediation
falters.11
2
Fact-finding statutes vary greatly in terms of the employee groups
covered by the procedure. In only two states are all public employees
in the federal service, where collective bargaining and compulsory arbritration wero
introduced simultaneously, four consecutive negotiations were followed by arbritration.
See also Note, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 549, 560-62.
110. Mxci. STAT. ANt. § 17.455(7) (Supp. 1966); MnvN. STAT. § 179.52 (Supp.
1966); OrE. REv. STAT. § 662.435 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4) (b) (Supp.
1966).
111. At least fourteen states have provided fact-finding procedures for all or part
of their public labor force: CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-473 (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 24, §§ 10-3-(8-11) (Smith-Hurd 1962); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 90.15-.27 (Supp.
1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, §§ 980-92 (Supp. 1966); MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
149, § 178J (Supp. 1965); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455 (1-16) (Supp. 1965); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 179.521 (1966); N.Y. GEN. MuNIc. §§ 681-85 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE:
§ 34-11-(02-05) (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. § 342.470 (1965); Ou. REv. STAT. § 662.435
(1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.1-(1-14),
28-9.2-(1-14) (Supp. 1965); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28.72.060 (Supp. 1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(c) (Supp. 1966).
112. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7.473(b) (1966) which provides that fact-
finding may not be instituted until mediation has failed, see Lazar, Lombardi & Seltzer,
The Tripartite Commissions in Public Interest Labor Disputes in Minnesota, 1940-1960,
14 LAB. L.J. 419 (1963); Northrup, Fact-Finding in Labor Disputes: The State's
Experience, 17 Iho. & LAB. REL. REV. 114 (1963); Note, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 549, 566.
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within the scope of the act," 3 and in only two others are all state
government employees included.114 Firefighters, police and teachers
are most often included in such legislation, probably reflecting the
political influence of these groups rather than the essential -nature of
their services. 115
In general, the fact-finding statutes require that collective bargain-
ing reach an absolute impasse before fact-finders may be appointed. 116
This is sound policy, since easily available fact-finding procedures
would be subject to some of the same criticism as compulsory
arbitration.11 The Wisconsin procedures preliminary to opening the
fact-finding hearing are lengthy, but the statistics of the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board indicate that the time is well spent.
Of seventy-three petitions for fact-finding filed, thirty-five were settled
by mediation prior to fact-finding, two were withdrawn, and two were
dismissed for technical reasons. Of the remaining thirty-four, six were
consolidated with other cases, making a total of twenty-eight fact-
finding cases which advanced to the hearing stage." 8
Although it is too early to make a thorough evaluation of the fact-
finding statutes, their popularity indicates a certain degree of success.
None have been repealed and some have been amended to correct
deficiencies made apparent through experience." 9 However, parties
resorting to fact-finding are in reality recognizing that collective
bargaining has failed, and for this reason care must be taken that fact-
finding is sparingly employed. The Wisconsin preliminary procedures
appear well adapted to insure this result. By encouraging the parties
113. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11-(02-05) (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1
(1964).
114. MwNu. STAT. ANN. 8 179.521 (1966). On June 28 1966, the governor of
Wisconsin signed the Wisconsin State Employee Act (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.80-92)
which provides fact-finding for all state employees effective January 1, 1967, making
that state the second to provide such facilities for state employees. See 1966 ABA
184; Krinsky, Public Employment Fact-Finding in Fourteen States, 17 LAB. L.J.
532, 533 (1966).
115. Krinsky, supra note 114, at 534. If the essential nature of the services rendered
was the determining factor in coverage under a statute, one would not expect to find
states where firemen are covered and policemen not, yet such is the case. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 10-3-(8-11) (1962); IowA CODE ANN. § 90.15-27 (Supp.
1965); and ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, §§ 980-92 (Supp. 1966), all of which cover
firemen but not policemen.
116. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4) (e) (Supp. 1966), which requires either
that after a reasonable period of negotiation the parties continue to be deadlocked
or that one of the parties refuses to negotiate in good faith before the procedures are
available.
117. See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text.
118. Stem, The Wisconsin Public Employee Fact-Finding Procedure, 20 IND. & LAB.
REL. REv. 3, 5 (1966).
119. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1966). The procedure was created
by L. 1961 ch. 663 and amended by L. 1963 ch. 87. In addition see note 114 supra,
noting that a similar law was passed in 1966 covering state employees.
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to make every effort at a compromise settlement through the assistance
of a mediator, such procedure stimulates the development of mature
collective bargaining techniques. At the same time fact-finding
machinery is available as an additional safe-guard against disruption
of the public service.
IV. CONCLUSION
In only a few states have public employees' rights received the
proper legislative attention. Increased activity in the public sector
makes it incumbent upon the states to develop reasonable and com-
prehensive legislation effectuating the rights of public employees
while giving due consideration to the public interest. This legislation
should include:
1. Positive recognition of the right to strike by employees in those
areas of public employment where work stoppages do not present a
direct threat to the public health and safety.
2. Specification of unfair labor practices including the failure to
bargain in, good faith.
3. Establishment of a Public Employment Relations Board with the
following powers:
a. To conduct elections and certify exclusive employee represen-
tatives;
b. To determine the appropriate unit;
c. To investigate and remedy unfair labor practices;
d. To provide a combination of mediation and fact-finding facil-
ities for the resolution of collective bargaining impasses; and
e. To determine when strikes endanger the public health and
safety, and to petition the courts for injunctive relief.
The more equitable distribution of bargaining power resulting from
permissive strike legislation will give the employees a stronger voice
in determining the conditions of their employment. The responsible
exercise of these rights requires the establishment of a Public Employ-
ment Relations Board in order to maximize effective collective bargain-
ing and to minimize disruptions of governmental services.
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Removal Of Federal Judges-Alternatives
to Impeachment
Impeachment . . . is the heaviest piece of artillery in the con-
gressional arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary
use. It is like a hundred-ton gun which needs complex machinery to
bring it into position, an enormous charge of powder to fire it, and a
large mark to aim at.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Article II, section 4 of the Constitution provides that the President,
Vice-President and civil officers of the United States may be re-
moved on impeachment and conviction of treason, bribery, high crimes
and misdemeanors. This provision is the Constitution's only express
means for removal of federal judges from office.
The inadequacy of impeachment for the task of controlling the be-
havior of judges seems abundantly clear. President Jefferson described
impeachment as a "bungling way of removing judges . . .an im-
practicable thing-a mere scare crow;"2 in 1807 he predicted, "im-
peachment is a farce which will not be tried again."3 Experience with
impeachment,4 and the recent case of Chandler v. Judicial Council of
the Tenth Circuit,5 have in large measure confirmed the validity of
President Jefferson's opinions. Presently, there is considerable feeling
that, in a system as large and as overburdened as the federal judiciary,
a need exists for other procedures to deal with judges who are unfit
for office through some fault of their own or through physical or
mental disability.
6
This article examines the inherent weaknesses both in the impeach-
1. 1. BRYcE, THE AMERcAN CoMMoNwEALTH 211 (1st ed. 1876).
2. 1. WAnREN, THE SUPREM:E CoURT IN UN=-ED STATES HISTORY 295 (1923).
3. Letter from President Jefferson to William Branch Giles, April 20, 1807, in II
JEFFERsON, WmTNGs 1191 (1904).
4. SIMPSON, FEDERAL IMEAcHmNTs (1916), comments on the inadequacies of
impeachment which history had revealed through the early 1900's. BomrN, THE CoR-
RUPT JUDGE (1962), comments on the inadequacy of impeachment which more recent
history has revealed.
5. 382 U.S. 1003 (1966). This case was described by one writer as an "attempt
to circumvent the inadequacies of the present removal methods." Comment, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1385 (1966). For further discussion of this case see notes 17, 18
and 19 infra and accompanying text.
6. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1966), and
Report of the Committee on the Removal and Discipline of Judges, Section on
Judicial Administration, A. B. A. (1964) jhereinafter cited as ABA Committee Re-
port].
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ment probes and in current alternative statutory procedures, includ-
ing constitutional and practical questions involved in establishing an
effective statutory procedure to deal adequately with incompetent
judges. Finally the article suggests possible means to remedy these
existing weaknesses.
II. TAE MISBEH ViNG JUDGE,
A. Inadequacy of Impeachment
Supreme Court Justices are so few in number and so often in the
public eye that their misbehavior is readily susceptible to the im-
peachment process. But since impeachment is only available for
rather serious misconduct 7 it is too remote a remedy to insure the
efficiency or honesty of inferior court judges.8 For example, if a
neglectful judge is constantly behind in his caseload, a censure from
an official body might be appropriate, but impeachment is neither
desirable nor available. History assures the judge in office that Con-
gress will hesitate to proceed against him unless his misbehavior is
severe,9 and even if Congress decides to investigate a judge, its pro-
cedure is so slow and cumbersome that parties are forced to litigate
before him long after his misbehavior has rendered him unfit for
office.10
The impeachment procedure is unfair to the judges as well. Im-
peachment trials have not been free of either political bias or tactics
which would be improper in a true judicial proceeding." Furthermore,
the legislative triers of an impeached judge have more pressing matters
which consume their time, and therefore may be forced to acquit or
convict the accused with only a superficial knowledge of the evidence
presented.12
B. Presently Available Alternatives
Currently, two alternative statutory procedures are available to
control misbehaving inferior court judges. 'One is aimed solely at the
7. SImPsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 30-60, 51.
8. Currently, there is provision for 442 inferior court judges: 84 Circuit Court of
Appeals judges, 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1964), as amended, 80 Stat. 77 (1966); 337
district court judges, 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1964), as amended, 80 Stat. 77 (1966); 7
Court of Claims judges, 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1964), as amended, 80 Stat. 140 (1966); 5
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals judges, 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1964); 9 Customs
Court judges, 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1964).
9. Only 8 judges have been impeached thus far. BoRumN, op. cit. supra note 4, at
198-99.
10. Id. at 633.
11. CARPENRr, JurDcAuL TEN RE IN =E Unmr, STATEs 101-54 (1918).
12. In one impeachment trial at one point there were only three Senators on the
floor to hear the proceedings. Time, March 16, 1936, p. 18.
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removal of a judge who accepts a bribe; 13 however, since many acts
other than accepting bribes render a judge unfit foi office, this pro-
vision's narrow scope limits its utility.
A second procedure' 4 authorizes the judicial council in each circuit
to make orders for the administration of business in the circuit and
requires the district judges promptly to carry these orders into effect.
There is, however, no judicial council to make orders promoting the
efficiency of judges of the Court of Claims, Customs Court, Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, 15 or of judges of the circuit courts them-
selves. Further, the scope of the council's order-maling power is un-
certain, and legislative history clearly indicates the judicial council
cannot order a judge removed from office.
16
Recently, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit ordered District
Judge Stephen J. Chandler to refrain from hearing cases.17 The United
13. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1964). This section of the code includes within it the pro-
vision which originally was 1 Stat. 117 (1790). 1 Stat. 117, which remained substantially
intact until 1962, dealt only with judges who accepted bribes. See 18 U.S.C. § 207
(1954). In 1962 this provision on the bribery of judges was consolidated with the
provision on the bribery of other governmental officers. S. BEP. No. 2213, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7-8 (1962). Some commentators question whether the successful application
of this provision results automatically in the removal of the guilty judge. See note 32
infra.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1964): "Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders
for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within
its circuit. The district judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the
judicial council."
15. The Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are now
definitely article III courts. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). Probably
the same is true of the Customs Court. Wmosr, FEDErAL CouNTS 31 (1963).
16. "Some people have urged that the bill does not have teeth in it, that you
really cannot do anything with a judge who will not decide cases. . . . At least, it
does this: If, after all the admonition that may come from the circuit judges, a
district judge still persists in neglecting his work . . . in an extreme case it would
seem to me a perfectly just cause for the remedy and method of impeachment."
Testimony of Harold Vanderbilt on the bill which was to become 28 U.S.C. § 332,
which he helped draft. Hearings on S. 188 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1939).
17. On December 13, 1965, the Judicial Council made such an order to District
Judge Stephen J. Chandler. Orders of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit,
Matter of Chandler (Special Session, Dec. 1965). Chandler requested the United
States Supreme Court to stay this order. The majority refused to grant a stay on
the ground that the order was only interlocutory. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966). The majority found that the order was
interlocutory because the Judicial Council indicated that Judge Chandler would
receive a hearing at which he could be represented by counsel to contest the order.
The Council issued this order. Order of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit,
Matter of Chandler (Special Session, Jan. 1966). On February 10, 1966, the Judicial
Council cancelled the hearing because "no judge of the Western District of Oklahoma
[Chandler] wishes to be heard.... .Order of the Judicial Council of the Tenth
Circuit, Matter of Division of Business in the Western District of Oklahoma (Special
Session, Feb. 1966). The Order of February, 1966 also restored all civil, bankruptcy,
and criminal cases that bad been assigned to him as of December 28, 1965, but
1967]
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States Supreme Court declined to determine the judicial council's
power to promulgate such orders;18 however, a strong dissent urged
that the judicial councils have no such disciplinary authority, and
insisted that the sole disciplinary device is impeachment. 19 Further-
more, the lack of elementary procedural safeguards to protect the
judge's fights casts doubt upon the validity of the order-making pro-
cedure as a disciplinary device. In effect, the judicial council used
this provision as a basis for suspending a judge through a proceeding
both instituted and decided by that council without affording the
judge an opportunity to be heard. The Chandler case revealed one
further weakness in the order-making provision. If a district judge
does not wish to carry out the council's order, this provision supplies
no sanctions with which the judicial council can enforce its demands.
In such a situation, the only present sanction is impeachment.
20
The inadequacies of impeachment and present alternative statutory
methods indicate the need for an improved procedure dealing with
misbehaving inferior court judges. Before any improvements can be
suggested, however, it is necessary to consider whether the Constitu-
tion allows any alternative to impeachment.
C. Constitutional Question
Legal commentators have said that impeachment and conviction by
Congress is the only constitutionally permissible method to remove a
federal judge.21 Under this theory the statute empowering a court to
made no provision for assignment of additional cases. On the order, thus modified,
a petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus is still before the Supreme Court.
18. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966). The
majority did not reach a decision on the merits. See note 17 supra.
19. Justice Douglas joined Justice Black: "I think the Council is completely without
legal authority to issue any such order . . . with or without a hearing . . . and that
the Constitution forbids it." Id. at 1004.
20. See note 17 supra.
21. This statement was apparently first made by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist
papers: "The precautions for their [judges'] responsibility are comprised in the article
respecting impeachments. . . . This is the only provision on the point which is con-
sistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one
which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges." Tim FaMMUusT
No. 79, at 492-93 (Lodge ed. 1888) (Hamilton). While Hamilton's views on the
Constitution are important, they are not decisive. The Supreme Court definitely
rejected Hamilton's view that officers appointed by the President and Senate are
only removable by the President and Senate. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926).
This statement has also been made in several law review articles, notably Brown,
The Impeachment of the Federal Judiciarj, 26 HAv. L. REV. 684 (1913); Otis, A Pro-
posed Tribunal: Is it ConstitutionaP, 7 U. KAN. Crr L. REv. 1 (1938); Note, 51
HAzv. L. REv. 330 (1937). Only the Otis article, however, took the view that any
other method of removal definitely would be unconstitutional. The Otis article relied
on the Federalist statement, the constitutional provision that the House of Rep-
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remove a judge for accepting a bribe is unconstitutional and only
constitutional amendment can improve the present defective removal
procedure. 22 There is, however, another theory that the Constitution,
in addition to expressly providing for Congressional removal of a judge
by impeachment and conviction, impliedly allows the judicial branch
itself to remove a misbehaving judge.23 There are two sound bases
for this view.
First, at common law in England there were methods by which the
executive, the legislature and the judiciary could remove judges.2
In the United States, the basic constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers would have prevented the use of these methods by the ex-
ecutive or the legislature if the framers had not provided otherwise by
formulating the impeachment procedure. However, the absence of
an express constitutional provision for executive removal of judges
implies a rejection by the framers of this possibility. Likewise the
framers impliedly rejected all methods of removal of judges by the
legislature, except impeachment, since impeachment was the only
method expressly provided. Yet, because the basic doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers would not apply to prevent removal of judges by
the judicial branch itself, the failure of the framers expressly to pro-
vide for this method of removal in the Constitution does not neces-
sarily imply its rejection.
Second, the separation of powers concept stresses the independence
of the three branches of government. Independence logically requires
not only freedom from interference by the other branches but also
freedom for each branch to perform those tasks assigned to it by the
Constitution. James Madison recognized this truth when he argued
the importance of strictly construing a legislative check on the execu-
resentatives had the sole power of impeachment and the Senate had the sole power
to try impeachments and the fact that "high crimes and misdemeanors" can be
interpreted to cover practically all misbehavior. Finally, this statement is made in
the ABA Committee Report, supra note 6. The Report's view is based mainly on the
Otis article.
22. The ABA Committee Report, supra note 6, proposes such an amendment.
23. Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possi-
bilities Under the Constitution, 28 MicH. L. REv. pts. 1-3 485, 723, 870 (1930). On
three occasions bills based on this view have been introduced in Congress. H.R. 2271,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. 9160, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H.R. 146, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). H.R. 2271 and H.R. 146 were favorably reported to the
House, H.R. REP. No. 814, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. REP. No. 921, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), and passed the House, but failed in the Senate. H.R. 2271
and H.R. 146 received the approval of the ABA. 62 A.B.A. REP. 127 (1937); 65 A.B.A.
REP. 78-80, 100 (1940).
24. Common law methods of removal were: Executive-Prior to the Act of Settle-
ment most judges held office at the pleasure of the king. Legislative-Impeachment,




tive, since a broad construction would hamper the President in the
preformance of his executive power.
There is another maxim which ought to direct us in expounding the
Constitution .... It is ... that the three great departments of Government
be kept separate and distinct; and if in any case they are blended, it is in
order to admit a partial qualification, in order more effectually to guard
against an entire consolidation. I think, therefore, when we review the
several parts of this Constitution ...we must suppose they [the depart-
ments] were intended to be kept separate in all cases in which they are
not blended, and ought, consequently, to expound the Constitution so as to
blend them as little as possible.25
Just as article II, section 1 vests in the President the executive power,
article III, section 1 states:
The judicial powers of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.
At the time of the framing of the Constitution removing judges was
a traditional exercise of the judicial power26 and a removal procedure
would seem clearly to fall within the constitutional definition of the
judicial function-that is, hearing cases and controversies.2 7 If Madi-
son's observation may be extended to apply to the separation of the
legislative and judicial branches, the doctrine of separation of powers
would require a narrow construction of impeachment as a legislative
check on the judiciary, and allow the removal of judges by the judicial
branch in a proper judicial proceeding.28
On the other hand, the concept of separation of powers does not
prevent Congress from conferring on a court, by statute, jurisdiction
to conduct a proceeding to remove a judge. Outside of the relatively
narrow original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Constitution
entrusts to Congress the task of determining, within specific guidelines,
25. 1ANNALSOF CONG. 497 (1789).
26. Shartel, supra note 23, at 882-83.
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. A proceeding to remove a judge from office would be
a case or controversy since it would involve a decision of controverted questions of
law and fact and a controversy between the United States and an office holder over
the title to an office.
28. If this construction of the Constitution were accepted, the power of the judicial
branch would be more nearly co-ordinate with the power of the legislative and
executive branches. Article I, § 5, provides that Congress may remove its own members
and Myers v. United States, supra note 21, held that the President could remove mem-
bers of the executive branch. One commentator has observed that as long as im-
peachment is the only way a judge can be removed, judges will be dependent on




the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This principle has been accepted
since it was first espoused in Cary v. Curtiss :
29
... the judicial power... although it has its origin in the Constitution,
is .. .dependent for its distribution . . .upon ...Congress, who possess
... power of investing them [courts] with jurisdiction....
Since the Constitution gives the legislative branch the task of con-
ferring jurisdiction upon the courts, it would not be inconsistent to-
say that the separation of powers concept on the one hand indicates
only a limited power in the legislature to remove a judge and a fuller
power to remove in the judiciary, but on the other hand does not
prevent the legislature from conferring upon the judiciary the juris-
diction to exercise this power. 0
The members of the first Congress, including many framers of the
Constitution, evidently believed the Constitution permitted removal
of judges by the judiciary. They passed a law3' which apparently2
provided that a court could remove from office a judge who accepted
a bribe.
The courts have never determined whether the Constitution per-
29. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); WRIGHT, FEDmuL CouRTs 24 and cases cited
SndnsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 24 n.26. Even in an area-rules of procedure-where
some have contended that the Supreme Court had an inherent power, the Court has
agreed that action by Congress is not an interference by the legislature in the judicial
branch, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) (Congress has undoubted power
to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts), despite Wigmore, All
Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv.
276 (1928). Such power in Congress is not so great as some apparently fear. See
e.g., Otis, supra note 21. Congress is limited because it must confer jurisdiction on
an article HI court. For a general discussion of the requirements for an article III
court, see WRIGHT, FEDERAL CousRTs 24-32 and cases cited therein.
30. Compare: Madison saw no inconsistency in saying that the Congress could
create an executive department which would aid the President in performing his
executive function but could not limit the ability of the President to perform his
executive function by limiting his power to remove members of that department
1 ANNALw OF CONG., 496 (1789).
31. 1 State. 117 (1790) (now part of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1964), provided: "Every
judge of the United States, who ... accepts ... money, or other bribe... shall be fined.
and imprisoned at the discretion of the court, and shall be forever disqualified to.
hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States."
32. ABA Committee Report, supra note 6, cites Burton v. United States, 202 U.S.
344 (1906), for the proposition that this "statute does 'not operate, ipso facto, to.
vacate the seat' of the convicted judge." However, Burto only held that a similar
provision did not operate, ipso facto, to vacate the seat of a Senator for the reason
that a Senator was not an officer under the United States Government. Id. at 369. A,
logical inference is that, had the Senator been an officer under the United States.
Government, the provision would have, ipso facto, vacated the Senator's seat. A judge
is an officer under the government of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
Burton would, therefore, seem to be authority for the proposition that 1 Stat. 11'T
provided an alternative method of removing judges for accepting bribes.
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mits a method of removal of judges other than impeachment. 3 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has determined that the express provision for
impeachment does not prevent the President from removing civil
officers within the executive department,34 or judges from removing
administrative officers within the judicial department.35 If the Supreme
Court were presented with a statute which provided a method where-
by a judicial body could remove a judge from office for misbehavior,
there would thus be a good basis for holding that statute constitu-
tional.
D. Constitutional Requirements for an Improved Alternative
Assuming that the Constitution allows removal of judges by the
judicial branch, it is necessary to explain more fully the constitutional
requirements for such a proceeding. There are at least three such re-
quirements.
First, the doctrine of separation of powers requires the proceeding
for removal to be exclusively within the judicial branch.3 6 This means,
for example, that the attorney general could not be permitted to
initiate a removal proceeding since such authority might provide him
with the power to harass a judge with whom the executive disagreed
politically. Such harassment would be an unconstitutional interference
in the affairs of the judicial department.
On the same basis neither the Judiciary Committee of the House
nor the House of Representatives itself could initiate such a proceed-
ing. Impeachment is an exception to the overriding policy of sepa-
ration of powers, and the express provision in the Constitution must
be viewed not only as a grant of power to Congress but as a limitation
on this power. The impeachment procedure was made somewhat
cumbersome so that the legislative branch could not remove a judge
simply because of his political views.3 7 Therefore, to permit the House
to initiate removal proceedings other than impeachment would allow it
33. Several decisions in dictum or dissent have stated that a federal judge could
be removed only through impeachment and conviction. Chandler v. Judicial Council
of the Tenth Circuit, supra note 18, at 1003 (dissent); Wingard v. United States, 141
U.S. 201, 203 (1891) (dissent); Clark v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 594 (Ct. Cl.
1947) (dictum).
34. Myers v. United States, supra note 21.
35. Reagan v. United States, 182.U.S. 419 (1901); In the matter of Hennen, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
36. Myers v. United States, supra note 21, at 116: "From this division on principle,
the reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should be
kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended .. "
37. Thus the framers rejected removal by address for the reason that "judges
would be in a bad situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which might




to participate in a proceeding somewhat less difficult than that ex-
pressly provided, thus defeating the policy behind the specific restric-
tion embodied in the Constitution.
Second, because the proceeding should be exclusively within the
judicial branch, only judges with good behavior tenure could pre-
side.38 Thus, laymen or attorneys, though allowed to function in an
investigatory capacity, could not sit on a tribunal to determine a case.
Third, the proceedings for removal should have the fundamental
requisites of a fair trial:39 (a) the judge should have an opportunity
to be fully informed of the nature of the charge in time to prepare
to meet it; and (b) the judge with the aid of counsel, must be
granted an opportunity fully to present his contentions to an unbiased
tribunal.
E. Desirable Features of an Improved Alternative
Several states provide methods for removal of judges within the
judiciary.4 Experience in operating these state procedures suggests
several other desirable features for an alternative method of removal
for misbehavior.
For instance, one body should be empowered to investigate com-
plaints and initiate charges; that body should have continuity. New
York's Court on the Judiciary may be convened at the request of the
chief judge of the court of appeals, the governor, the legislature, or a
committee of the bar.41 Though this court has been in existence
since 1948 it has only been convened three times.4 California's
Commission on Judicial Qualifications investigates complaints, pre-
fers charges, and sits as a continuing body.4 For the period January
38. All judges of courts within the judicial branch hold office during good be-
havior. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 7.
39. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227
U.S. 88, 93 (1913); The Reno, 61 F.2d 966, 968 (2d Cir. 1932).
40. Several states have procedures whereby judges may be removed by the judiciary
for misbehavior or disability: ALA. CoNsT. art. 7, § 176; CAL. CoNsT. art. 6, § 10(b);
ILL. CoNsT. art. 6, § 18; IND. CO NST. art. 7, § 12; IowA CODE ANN. §§ 605.26, 605.27,
605.28 (1949); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 22; Omo Rtv. CODE ANN. § 2701.11 (Baldwin
1964); OnE. CONsT. art. 7, § 6, ORE. REv. STAT. § 1.310 (1965); TEx. CoNsT. art. 5,
§ 1-a.
Other states have procedures whereby judges may be removed by the judiciary for
misbehavior alone: LA. CONsT. art. 9, §§ 4, 5; NxB. CONST. art. 3, § 17.
Still other states have procedures whereby judges -may be removed by the judiciary
for disability alone: ALASKA CoNsT. art. 4, § 10; CoLO. CoNsT. art. ,6, § 23; CONN.
Gin. STAT. Ifv. § 51-49 (1958); HA Au CoNsT. art. 5, § 4; MmiN. STAT. ANN. .
490.04 (1958); Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 27; UTAH. CODE ANN. § § 49-7-3, 49-7-4 (1953)..
41. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 22.
42. Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 1117, 1125 n.32
(1966).
43. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 10(b); Frankel, supra note 42, at 1128.
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1, 1964 to December 31, 1965, action of the Commission caused
the resignation or retirement of ten judges.44 One can conclude
that unless a continuing body is given sole responsibility for in-
vestigating complaints and initiating charges, the result will be only
a slight improvement over a system limited to removal by legis-
lative impeachment. Such a continuing body would have an additional
advantage in that it could acquire skill in investigating misbehavior
charges. This skill is a necessity in the light of another desirable fea-
ture-privacy.
The complaints to, and proceedings of, the investigating and charg-
ing body should be private in order to increase public confidence
in, and respect for, the judiciary. If dissatisfied litigants are allowed
to make the investigating body into a forum for public attacks on
judges, the alternative method could severely injure the judiciary's
public image. Experience shows that the public may believe even a
groundless accusation if repeated often enough. Furthermore, privacy
provisions would permit a lawyer to make complaints about a judge's
conduct when otherwise he might hesitate through fear of alienating
a judge before whom he must practice.45 California provides that
the proceedings of its investigating body shall be private until that
body decides that removal is appropriate. 46 The body then makes a
recommendation for removal to the California Supreme Court which
conducts a public trial.47 The privacy provision insures that only
well-grounded complaints will be made public. On the other hand,
there should be a provision for final judgment only after public trial
to insure that the provision for privacy will not cause the judge's
removal in a secret Star Chamber proceeding.
In addition, the court vested with final power to remove should
also be vested with power to suspend pending the outcome of the
proceedings. California made no express provision for suspension, but
the state attorney general has ruled that the supreme court could
suspend a judge whose removal had been recommended.48 The utility
of a suspension provision is obvious. There may be a delay between
the initiation of judicial proceedings and final judgment concerning
fitness, and litigants should not be forced to try their cases before a
judge whose position is in doubt.
F. Suggestions
In light of the discussion of present federal procedures, require-
44. Frankel, supra note 42, at 1129.
45. Note, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rmv. 149, 179 (1966).
46. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 10(b).
47. CA.. CONsT. art. 6, § 10(6).
48. 41 Ors. ATr'Y GEN. 140 (1963).
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ments of the Constitution and desirable features of state procedures,
the following suggestions are made for consideration in drafting a
statute to provide an improved alternative method for promoting the
honesty and efficiency of inferior court federal judges.
The presently constituted judicial councils of the circuits should
be empowered to investigate complaints of judicial misbehavior, to
hold a hearing on the complaint, and to censure or recommend to
the chief justice the removal of judges within the circuit. The judicial
councils are particularly appropriate for this task since they meet
regularly and carry out supervisory functions.49 The provision for
censure allows the council to proceed though it feels that the judge's
misbehavior is not so severe as to require removal.
All proceedings before the judicial council should be confidential.
This provision will protect the acquitted judge and the complaining
party.
The judicial council should make a recommendation of removal
to the chief justice, who would be empowered to suspend the ac-
cused judge. The chief justice would then appoint a previously un-
involved party to act as formal plaintiff50 and would order the judicial
council of another circuit to hold a trial de novo. This body would
have the power to reverse, modify, or affirm the original council's
decision. The trial would be public and would be presided over by
judges who had not been involved in the investigation. The judicial
council of another circuit appears the best body to conduct the trial,
since the only other judicial body currently exercising a supervisory
role, the Judicial Conference of the United States, would be un-
wieldy.51
The court should apply the "good behavior" standard of article III,
section 1 of the Constitution in determining whether disciplinary
action is necessary. Such a standard in effect would place in the
judiciary the sole power to determine grounds for removal and censure.
This power is consonant with judicial independence and would avoid
an enumeration of grounds which inevitably would fail to be complete.
The formal plaintiff should have the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the judge has violated the good be-
havior standard. The preponderance of evidence burden is thouglt
more appropriate than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden be-
cause of the non-criminal nature of the hearing and the higher be-
49. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1964).
50. The Chief Justice might appoint the attorney general or the solicitor general.
Since these members of the executive branch would be acting at the instance of the
Chief Justice, their action would not be called an interference by the executive branch
in the affairs of the judicial branch.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1964). The Judicial Conference consists of 25 judges.
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havorial standards to which judges are expected to conform.52
Appeal from the second judicial council's decision should lie to the
Supreme Court. Appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court would
further guarantee the fairness of the procedure and make certain that
case law would develop a uniform definition of the good behavior
standard.
The final order should extend no further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold office. However, the removed judge
should remain subject to punishment for his indictable offenses.
For the purposes of this statute, the Customs Court, the Court of
Claims, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals should be in-
cluded within the circuit of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
III. TBE DIsABLED JUrDGE
A. Inadequacy of Impeachment
The disabled judge presents a different, though no less serious, prob-
lem than the misbehaving judge. A judge may fail to perform ef-
ficiently because of physical or mental disability or simply because
he is senile; yet the disabled judge cannot be removed by impeach-
ment.
53
B. Presently Available Alternative
Currently there is available an alternative method of dealing with
a disabled judge:54 either a majority of the judicial council of the
circuit (if the judge is a circuit or a district judge), or the chief
judge or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (if the judge sits
on the Customs Court, Court of Claims, or Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals) may certify the judge's disability to the President.
The President may then appoint another judge to the court on which
the disabled judge sits. The disabled judge remains in office and
receives the salary of his office, but loses his seniority.
52. See ABA, CANONS OF JunicmL ETrmcs (1924). Canon 4 provides: "A judge's
official conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety . , .
and his personal behavior . . .should be beyond reproach." Moreover such a standard
will avoid problems which might occur if the court applied the beyond-reasonable-
doubt burden. The removing judicial tribunal might be satisfied that a preponderance
of the. evidence established need for removal, but a subsequent jury would not be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge's behavior was criminal. The
removed-but subsequently acquitted judge could not validly ask for reinstatement
because of the difference in burden of proof requirements. For obvious reasons the
same considerations are not applicable to the removal of a disabled judge. See note
70 infra and accompanying text.
53. Impeachment lies only for treason, bribery, high crimes and misdemeanors. U.S.
CoNsT. art. 2, § 4.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1964).
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This provision places the responsibility for taking action on judges
who are closest to the disabled judge.55 These judges are naturally
hesitant to take such a step, and the provision has apparently been
used only once and then at the request of the district judge.5 6 Further-
more, the provision does not spell out the method whereby the re-
sponsible judges are to determine the degree of disability. There is
no requirement for a hearing or for examination by a physician. A final




As stated above, it appears that the express provision for removal
of judges by impeachment and conviction may not prevent a pro-
cedure whereby the judiciary itself removes judges who misbehave.
The provision for good behavior tenure indicates, however, that a
judge can never be removed for physical or mental disability, since
this disability occurs through no fault of his own.58 It seems agreed
that disabled Justices of the Supreme Court cannot constitutionally
be removed.59 There is, however, substantial basis for the view60 that
the Constitution permits a judicial body to remove a disabled inferior
court judge so long as the judge's salary is continued.
An increasingly expansive interpretation of the protections afforded
by due process 61 may require the removal of disabled judges. 62 Due
process of law demands that litigants in the courts have a fair trial,
63
55. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
56. Id. at 10.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1964), says "judge who is eligible to retire under this
section .. " If Supreme Court Justices had been intended to be amenable to this
provision, the words would have been "judges or justices who ..... "Compare 28
U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
58. Hamilton seems to have thought that this was the case. "The want of a pro-
vision for removing the judges on account of inability has been the subject of com-
plaint. But . . . such provision would . . . be more liable to abuse than calculated
to answer any good purpose." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 493 (Lodge ed. 1888)
(Hamilton). Yet Hamilton's view was ambiguous for he continues ". . . insanity, without
any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualifica-
tion." Ibid.
59. Major, Why Not Mandatory Retirement for Federal Judges?, 52 A.B.A.J. 29
(1966).
60. Shartel, supra note 23; Comment, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1385 (1966).
61. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355
(1963). Though these cases involved the right to counsel under the sixth amendment,
due process requires that criminal cases be tried in accordance with the specifications
of the fifth and sixth amendments. CORWrn, Tim CoNsTrrumON AND WHAT rr MEANS
TODAY 170 (10th ed. 1948).
62. Comment, supra note 60.
63. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
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but it is doubtful that a mentally disabled judge could assure this.
Further, though appeal is available, the time and expense of this
method are two practical reasons why the possibility of appellate
correction probably would not cure the due process defect of such a
trial. One writer has suggested that it may be a denial of due process
even to assign a disabled judge to a case, if there is knowledge that
the judge is not capable of conducting a fair trial. 4
Moreover, the concept of the "public well-being" indicates that
there are historical precedents for removal of the disabled judge. In
England, office holders with good behavior patents were apparently
subject to a prerogative65 of the sovereign to remove where govern-
mental convenience required, if the sovereign did not take away the
emoluments of office. In the United States public offices generally may
be abolished with the consequent removal of the office holders where
the "well-being of the public" demands. 66
In light of this principle and the requisites of due process it would
seem that the prerogative to remove a disabled judge, based upon
considerations of public well-being, would be lodged somewhere in
the sovereign and the only question is the location of that prerogative.
The doctrine of separation of powers would prevent its location in the
executive or the legislature, but not in the judiciary.
Under the above constitutional theory, when a judge is disabled
so that he cannot perform the duties of his office, the judge is
subject to removal by judicial proceeding if the proceeding does not
take away the emoluments of office. Thus a mandatory retirement
statute in which Congress set the retirement age would not be a con-
stitutional solution to the problem since Congress has no power to
remove a judge for disability. On the other hand, under this theory,
Congress could empower the Supreme Court to set a mandatory
retirement age for judges. Whether such a mandatory retirement
statute would be a satisfactory solution is another question.6 7
64. Comment, supra note 60.
65. Walter, C.B. of the Exchequer, 6 Foss, JuDc.s OF ENGLAND 210 (1966); and
Archer, C.!. of the Common Pleas, 7 id. at 51-53.
66. Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 104 (1890). Twice Congress has
debated the question whether, under the Constitution, Congress had power to abolish
judgeship when it abolished the inferior courts to which these judgeships belonged.
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 510-986 (1802); 48 CONG. REG. 7992-8002 (1912). This question,
however, is to be distinguished from the question involved here-whether, under the
Constitution, the judiciary could be empowered to remove disabled judges.
67. It is submitted that such a mandatory retirement statute would not be a satisfac-
tory solution since it is difBcult to set an age which would be right for every
judge. Justice Holmes was still alert at 85. On the other hand judges, like other
humans, are likely to be incapacitated from causes other than old age.
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D. Constitutional Requirements and Desirable Features
of an Improved Alternative
As with removal for misbehavior the Constitution requires that the
procedure for disability removal be entirely within the judicial branch
and grant the judge a fair hearing. The procedure would, of course,
allow the parties to produce medical evidence at the hearing. A judge
removed in this fashion could not be deprived of his salary.6a In ad-
dition, the features of privacy, the power to suspend, and a single
continuous body for investigation are desirable.69 To avoid the ap-
pearance of a criminal proceeding, privacy should be extended to
cover the entire procedure, unless the judge himself requests a public
trial. Experience with the present disability provision indicates that
the power to initiate the procedure for disability removal should be
placed in a body of judges other than those judges closest to the
disabled individual.
E. Suggestions
In light of the above discussion, the following suggestions are made
for consideration in the drafting of a statute to replace the current
statute dealing with the disabled judge.
The Chief Justice should be empowered to appoint judges to a
commission which could initiate a proceeding of the judicial council
of the circuit in which the judge sits to remove a judge who becomes
permanently disabled from performing his duties. Specific provision
should be made that a judge cannot be removed for disability unless
competent medical testimony establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the judge is permanently disabled from performing his duties.70
The judge's salary should continue after disability removal.
In addition to removal, the council and court should be empowered
to retire the disabled judge from regular active service, but with the
proviso that he be permitted to remain available for appointment to
hear occasional cases.71 All proceedings for disability removal, in-
cluding those before the courts as well as the council should be
private, unless at a certain stage the judge should request public
68. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 252-55 (1920). In holding that a judge holding
good behavior tenure was not subject to income tax on his salary the Court said:
"the primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution [of salary] was not to
benefit the judges, but ... to promote ...independence .... Such being its purpose,
it is to be construed ... not restrictively, but in accord with its spiritand the principle
on which it proceeds."
69. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 10(b), is available to handle the disabled judge, too.
70. In cases of disability, where there is no question of fault, the judge should be
given the benefit of the higher standard of proof. See note 52 supra and accompany-
ing text.
71. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1964).
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trial. In all other respects the procedure should be the same as the
procedure suggested above by which a judge is removed for mis-
behavior.
IV. CONCLUSION
Impeachment is an inappropriate method for dealing with the re-
moval and discipline of judges who misbehave. It also cannot be
used to remove mentally or physically disabled judges. Yet in a
system as large and as industrious as the federal judiciary the need
to insure that the judges are honest, efficient and competent is ob-
vious. The problem is not new. Statutory alternatives have been pro-
posed to promote judicial honesty and efficiency and to treat the
physically or mentally disabled judge. These alternative methods,
however, have not proved effective.
Though the question has never been decided by the courts and
is not free from doubt, there is a good basis for the view that the
Constitution allows statutory procedures whereby the judiciary itself
could deal with both the misbehaving and disabled judge. Any such
alternative statutory procedure, however, must take into account the
requirements of the Constitution and should take into account the
experiences of the states which have such procedures.
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